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Law regulates one thing
and one thing only:
human relationships.

The world is awash in
a sea of laws. Consider
consumer protection in the United
States, which is regulated by twentytwo separate federal regulations,1 in
addition to fifty sets of state regulations and countless district, county,
and municipal edicts. More dramatic
is China’s legal explosion accompanying its economic explosion. From
1979 to 1983, China passed 4,119
laws and regulations. Between 2001
and 2004, the number had grown
exponentially to 94,299.2 Local,
national, regional, and international
rules and regulations touch upon
every aspect of human behavior and
commercial activity.
These are only the official
regulations of governmental bodies;
individuals and companies constantly
create their own private laws through
contracts. Credit card applications,
automobile sales agreements, medical
waivers, and insurance contracts all
expand the rules we live by, based on
our willingness to accept them and
backed by the willingness of the court
system to enforce them.
Despite this all-encompassing
application of law to life, the plethora
of rules and regulations has a single
common denominator. Law regulates one thing and one thing only:
human relationships. Human rights
and criminal laws place limits on how
I may treat my neighbor; corporate
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governance codes lay out complex
relationships among directors,
managers, shareholders, employees,
and increasingly, the surrounding community. Each—whether
constitutional, regulatory, or contractual—expresses how people
are expected to relate in certain
situations and the consequences
if they fail to do so.
      Law is both a product of
and contributor to human relationships. The continuum of public and
private laws provides a way of setting
rules of behavior within a relational
context. Those relationships include
both stated mutual understandings
and unstated assumptions. When
well formulated, laws are established
through analysis, discussion, and giveand-take of parties, speaking for a
larger constituency, who bargain over
legitimate-but-differing needs and
interests. Through this process, the
rules of behavior arise from mutually
acceptable forms of negotiation.
When poorly formulated, a few individuals with the power to enforce can
simply mandate the relational rules
by fiat or exclusionary negotiations,
without sufficient regard for those
whose behavior and interests will be
affected. Attention to relationships
in lawmaking directly influences the
success of later implementation and
enforcement as well.
Implications of Law as
Relationship

If it is true that law regulates relationships, then legal professionals,
legislators, and legal reformers would
do well to base their legal analyses
on this premise. Legal reform is a
substantial industry. In the developing world, legal reform is a form
of technical assistance provided by
numerous international financial

institutions and bilateral donor organizations to help countries in transition and developing countries attain
greater economic growth and democratic freedoms. The effectiveness of
such assistance is highly dependent
upon the extent to which it recognizes and reinforces the relational
underpinnings of law.
Many countries have welldeveloped systems for negotiating
needed reforms through purposeful
involvement of varied stakeholders
in a participatory process. Elsewhere,
especially where the legislative process tends toward fiat, reformers can
ignore large sections of the population in passing laws. Each approach
sends a message about relationships
between governed and government;
correctly weaving a relational understanding into legal reform results in
far more effective lawmaking.
Unfortunately, many legal reform
efforts worldwide take a mechanistic approach to lawmaking. Laws
are seen as components that can be
removed and replaced to upgrade
the performance of a given policy.
Consequently, it does not much matter how the process is completed as
long as the law is adopted, preferably
on a fast-track basis with few delays
from comment, review, or analysis
by stakeholders or even parliaments.
The point is simply to upgrade the
legal framework. The paternalistic
assumptions of this approach ignore
the underlying social relationships
that the rules should be designed to
address, and regularly lead to a situation in which laws are not implemented but merely adopted.
Relational Lawmaking

A relational approach to matters of
law and policy begins with a better
informed understanding that the
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purpose of reform is not to adopt
laws but to change socioeconomic
behavior within a system of complex
relationships. Secured lending laws,
for example, permit borrowers and
lenders to reduce the costs and risks
of credit transactions by behaving
in a certain way (i.e., registering the
transaction) that limits fraud and
misunderstanding, which in turn
leads to greater access to affordable
credit. Other laws mandate behavior
to avoid penalties, such as a tax code.
In both cases, the regulatory regime
supervises how people act: it either
permits or prohibits certain behaviors by creating positive rewards and
opportunities or applying negative
sanctions and penalties.
Yet law is much more than the
simple regulation of behavior. It
arises from and defines individual
and social relationships. The nature
of the relationships in turn fundamentally affects how and whether
the proposed behavioral regulations
can be implemented or enforced
as intended. Implementation arises
from consensus—when people
agree on what should be done, they
can then implement that agreement. Enforcement is a product of
agreement as well—when one party
diverges from an agreed upon course
of action, force may sometimes be
legitimately employed to compel the
recalcitrant party to honor the terms
of the agreement.
Laws, regulations, and other rules
work best when those subject to the
laws believe them to be sufficiently
legitimate. Legitimacy arises from
the combination of at least three
sources of basic legitimacy: substance,
procedure, and representation. All of
these are connected to relationship
and either reinforce or undermine the
purposes of lawmaking.

Substantive legitimacy is achieved are intended to establish the framework for commerce by setting up the
when the content of the law adequately addresses the need being
“rules of the game” in accordance with
regulated. For example, a legitimate
proven international standards. The
regulation on building standards for
goal, frequently, can be described as
earthquake zones should not be based the adoption of well-written laws,
on building standards for oceanfront
based on an unstated belief that
property outside of the zone. The
substantive legitimacy is sufficient to
substance must match the purpose so
achieve the socioeconomic behavioral
that the desired behavior—building
goals addressed by the law.
safer buildings—will be achieved.
Albania, after decades of isolation
Procedural legitimacy arises
under the Hoxha regime, rejoined
from adequate compliance with an
the international community in
agreed upon system of rule making.
1993. Europe and the United States
Compliance, however, will establish
rushed to assist in the transition
to a Western-style, market-oriented,
legitimacy only if the procedure itself
democratic system of government.
is considered legitimate; this is the
By 1995, Albania had adopted a wide
essential difference between rule of
law and rule by law. A government
range of fundamental commercial
can fully comply with established
regulations, such as a bankruptcy law,
procedures to enforce its will, but if
company law, and a commercial code.
the procedures are considered illegiti- Yet few of these laws were effectively
mate, such as providing no vehicle for implemented. One Albanian legal
public input, then the substance will
professional explained that Albania
be difficult to enforce, even if the law had many excellent laws from France,
itself is excellent.
Representational legitimacy is
concerned with the participants
in the process. Most lawmaking
is done through representatives
The purpose of reform is
of the governed: parliamentarians, executive agencies, and
not to adopt laws but to
specialized bodies. If those who
change socioeconomic
make the laws are not considered
legitimate representatives of those
behavior within a system
subject to the laws, then the laws
of complex relationships.
will be considered illegitimate.
Colonial governments imposed
by force, for example, are generally not considered legitimate by
local populations. Consequently,
colonial laws—even if substantively
Germany, England, and even the
and procedurally legitimate—are
United States, but that these were
often considered illegitimate.
not perceived as Albanian laws and,
The importance of legitimacy can consequently, were not used.
The laws may have been substaneasily be seen through examples of
tively adequate but were adopted priinternational economic development
programs.3 Legal reform interventions marily through use of foreign drafters
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with limited local participation in
the process. In fact, the system for
legislative process did not require
any public comment before a draft

People accept the rules
of the game because they
respect the system by
which the rules are made.

became law. One banking regulator
frequently sought comments from the
banking community before implementing new regulations but did so
out of good will. Not all officials had
such good will. From a legitimacy
standpoint, process and representation were lacking.
Croatia provides examples of
both proper and improper attention to legitimacy. In the late 1990s,
Croatian legal experts decided to
draft a new law governing associations. A national umbrella association,
with more than ten thousand local
associations as members, discovered the initiative and asked to be
included in the process. The drafting
team begrudgingly gave the association two weeks to comment on the
draft before submitting it to parliament. The comments, along with
requests for further discussion, were
ignored, and the law was passed. The
association challenged the resulting law in court, where the law was
found to be unconstitutional in at
least 50 percent of its provisions. At
this point, legitimacy had failed at
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the substantive level—procedurally
by rejecting meaningful participation
and representationally by failing to
include sufficient expertise on the
drafting committee.
      The national association
thereafter sought to engage the
drafters in a more meaningful, effective approach. First,
they supplied experts from
the International Center for
Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)
from Budapest to assist the
local experts in redrafting the
law. Once satisfied, the drafting committee permitted the
national association to send
the draft for comment to the
association’s members, which
by then numbered thirteen thousand
associations. Yet these relatively new
organizations had little understanding of how to interpret and comment
on a piece of legislation, so only ten
of the thirteen thousand members
submitted comments. Rather than
consider this process sufficient, however, the national association arranged
for meetings around the country in
order to explain the draft, thus eliciting hundreds of useful comments,
many of which resulted in amendments to the draft. When eventually
submitted to parliament, the law was
readily passed and thereafter readily
implemented based on the consensus
and substantive quality achieved during the process.
The three-fold approach to
legitimacy explored in these examples
rests on a respectful approach to
relationships. When lawmakers
include the stakeholders who will be
affected by new laws, they not only
provide for greater substantive input
and local ownership but they also
foster healthier relationships between
government and governed. Even a

cursory look at the unstable regions
of the world reveals a chasm between
government and governed, rulers and
ruled. Inclusive policy making and
legislative processes provide an essential tool for reformulating societal
relationships.
Relationship as the
Basis for Enforcement

When policy making and legislative
processes are based on participation
by affected stakeholders, the processes
both recognize and reinforce the relationships between all parties. Law and
policy are generally negotiated among
competing interest groups, sometimes
with mutually exclusive interests. The
process allows the parties to buy into
the system that produces the rules.
When they perceive that they
are appropriately represented, given
a chance to voice their opinions, and
exposed to the arguments of competing interests, parties are more likely
to consider the outcome legitimate,
even if it does not fully achieve their
aims. In other words, they accept
the rules of the game because they
respect the system by which the rules
are made. This has implications for
implementation and enforcement
of those rules.
Implementation is a product of
consensus. Agreements can be implemented, but when there is no agreement, there is nothing to implement.
In the Croatian case noted earlier, the
second association law was readily
implemented because the process
produced mutual understanding and
agreement among the relevant actors.
In Albania, little implementation
followed passage of new laws because
little if any consensus had been
achieved through the process.
Consensus requires understanding, and understanding requires com-
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munication and participation in the
process. Understanding is achieved
only when there is effective communication among the parties to the
agreement. For legal reform programs,
this communication must often take
the form of public education and
outreach. During the lawmaking
process, outreach is used to ensure
feedback from stakeholders to inform
the content of the reforms. Once a
reform is passed, public education
is needed to announce the changes,
explain how they were legitimately
achieved, and explain the practical implications of implementation,
including benefits of compliance and
costs of non-compliance.
Trust, like understanding,
is fundamental to enforcement
and implementation. At the most
basic level, all economic transactions are founded upon some
form of trust relationship. In an
intimate society, such as a rural
village, trust can be enforced
through social sanctions. When
commercial transactions are
extended in a less intimate setting, where the parties have no
pre-existing relationship, laws
and legal systems provide proxies
for trust.
This continuum of trust has
an impact on economic development. Robert Cooter and
Hans-Bernd Schaeffer 4 point
out that in developing countries
there is a trust gap that damages
development. In a country such
as Mozambique, for example,
transactions at the village level
are vibrant, with little concern
for default. Likewise, a merchant
in Maputo will readily enter into
agreements with a trading partner
in London. Yet that same merchant
may not undertake a contract

with a fellow merchant from a distant Mozambican city.
The apparent anomaly is actually
consistent with issues of trust. In
the village, direct relationships
establish trust while social networks
ensure compliance. In the international transaction, Mozambicans
will trust British courts to enforce
the contract fairly should there be
a breach, even though they may
not fully trust their British trading
partners. Yet in Mozambique, merchants who do not know one another
know that they cannot trust the local
courts to fairly apply legitimate laws.
This is because the proxy for the trust

relationship between individuals—
trustworthy laws and institutions—
is insufficient. Trust is ultimately a
question of the quality of relationships, whether between the parties to
a transaction or between the public
and the institutions of government
needed to ensure compliance.
Many a legal reform initiative
has floundered on the shoals of
misunderstanding of market norms
and social norms, which often have
different aims but can easily be confused to the detriment of an otherwise well-executed reform initiative.5
Market norms define the parameters
of relationships related to transactions.
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The market requires clear rules,
predictable outcomes, and high
levels of performance, with specific
rewards and sanctions applied for
success and failure at each point
along the way. These norms hold
the market together. Social norms,
by contrast, preserve social relationships. They are less concerned with
costs and benefits and more concerned
with harmony and stability in the
social fabric. Market norms seek
to reconcile accounts; social norms
preserve relationships. One focuses
on financial reparations, the other
on relationship repair. Both norms
are valuable; both serve important
functions. Yet each can undermine
the other.
Commercial laws establish rules
based on market norms. However,
the judges and other officials in
developing or transition economies
who are expected to enforce the
rules often unknowingly apply social
norms. This is normally due either to
a lack of training about how the mar-

Trust and understanding
are fundamental
to enforcement and
implementation.

Similar confusion creates dangers
elsewhere in the economy, when
political norms (a subset of social
norms) are confused with market
norms. Political debts are paid off
through political actions, such as
delivering votes or supporting a
political initiative. Market debts are
paid off by fulfilling the terms of the
contract. In many countries, political leaders direct lending through
banks in order to enhance political
relationships. If the debtor fulfills
the incumbent political obligations,
the government may choose not to
enforce the loan agreement.
Unfortunately for the bank,
however, the loan agreement is set
in market terms, so the bank must
absorb the loss without meaningful
recourse to enforcement. Banks are
protected only when laws do not
permit such protection from repayment but instead enable banks to
enforce their commercial relationships without regard to the underlying political relationships.
Legitimate processes, coupled
with sufficient public education,
can establish the relationships
and the understanding of those
relationships necessary to create
trustworthy institutions that
will enforce market norms and
enable economic development.
Laws alone, even when substantively legitimate, cannot achieve
this goal.
Ethics, Relationships,
and Lawmaking

ket works or to an excess of indoctrination about the supposed superiority
of social norms. In either event, this
can result in a weak and ineffective
set of market rules and laws.
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Trustworthy legal systems and
institutions cannot be built or
maintained without an undergirding
support structure of ethics. Ethics—
whether personal, professional, legal,
governmental, or corporate—are
the mainstay of the rule of law and

the culture of accountability needed
for economic growth and social stability. Ethics can best be understood as
behavioral obligations reasonably
expected by parties to a relationship. As a starting point, this means
that ethical obligations depend on an
underlying relationship and cannot
exist properly without one. Likewise,
the nature of relationships defines
what can reasonably be expected.
For example, lawyers are subject to a code of ethics that provides
for different obligations to different
parties. To their clients, lawyers owe
a duty of representation, which is
strict but not absolute. Thus, a lawyer
must maintain confidential information of the client, for example. The
lawyer cannot, however, lie to the
client’s adversary about such information because the lawyer has an
a priori relationship with the legal
system, which forbids fraud. The
lawyer must be truthful to client
and adversary alike but need not be
volunteer unprivileged information
to an adversary unless asked. At the
same time, ethical standards provide
that a lawyer must reveal legal arguments that undermine the client’s
case because the lawyer has a duty
to the court to protect the system of
justice. In some cases, a lawyer must
even violate protected confidences of
a client if the client appears likely to
commit a crime, because the lawyer
has a greater duty to society. These
overlapping circles of relationship—
client, profession, court, society, and
adversary—define the parameters of
behavior and appropriate expectations within each relationship.
Ethical obligations are violated
when a person betrays the reasonable
expectations arising from a relationship. Judges, for example, have a
professional relationship with all liti-
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gants because they represent the state, By applying standards of legitimacy,
and have an obligation to preserve
reformers—especially domestic
the relationship between the state and reformers—can introduce concepts
the litigants by deciding cases accord- and practices of representative
ing to law. If they award a judgment
government that undermine and
based on biases or family ties, they
replace systems of authoritarian rule.
violate that relationship.
By introducing or insisting upon
Public corruption is another
participatory processes, healthy
form of betrayed relationships.
relationships between government
Governments are supposed to serve
and governed can be established
the public on the basis of merit and
or enhanced to support an ethos
achievement. When officials are able
of government service. By creating
to consolidate power and escape
consensus based on public interest,
accountability, they frequently turn
lawmaking can create the foundation
the public trust into a font of private
for implementation and appropriate
gain. The laws say one thing, but
enforcement of the rules of the game.
unless institutions enforce those
Effective and proper lawmaking
laws, practice quickly veers into illicit
is relational. It relies on legitimate
gains from rent-seeking behavior. In
substance, process, and representation, which in turn create healthier
a system based on might, corruption becomes an acceptable mode of
social relationships. These relationships promote implementation and
operation. Lawmaking frequently is
enforcement in accordance with the
deployed in favor of vested interests,
rule of law. The ethical demands of
or enforcement of seemingly legitimate laws is unavailable against the
the rule of law, in turn, require the
politically connected.
employment of a legitimate lawmaking system. By extension, it would
In a system based on the concept
seem that a system of lawmaking
of public service by limited, accountable government, such corruption is
that focuses on only one aspect of
recognized as a betrayal of the relation- legitimacy—substance—is far more
ship between the state and the public.
than inefficient. It is unethical.
When the two systems intersect in the
field of donor funding and technical
assistance, the donor states have a
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